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Editor’s Notes:  
1. This on-line case study was developed by Professors Carol Saunders, University 
of Oklahoma, Center for Management Information Systems Studies, and Blake 
Ives, Louisiana State University.  The case is designed to explore a number of 
issues faced by managers of Information Technology (IT). These issues include 
inter-organizational alliances, project management, management of IT personnel 
and commercial use of the World Wide Web. 
 
2. A timeline to help students follow this case is included as Appendix F. 
 
3. The .pdf version contains the entire text in linear form.  The .html version uses 
the capabilities of the Web to present the case in hypertext form and includes 
photographs.  
 
4. Faculty members who are listed in the IS Faculty Directory, located on the Web 
at http://webfoot.csom.umn.edu/ISWorld/FacDir/default.htm can send an e-mail 
to one of the authors (csaunders@ou.edu or bives@lsu.edu) requesting the 
teaching note that accompanies this case.  
 
PREFACE 
In July 1998, Hurley Myers, President of DxR Development Group, stared 
at the gray plastoid brain lying on the desk before him. A prop for the medical 
multimedia software his firm developed, it also was a suitable metaphor for the 
many critical decisions that he faced. Complicating these decisions was his 
uncertainty regarding the intentions of his partner and biggest customer, a large 
pharmaceutical company. For the next six months, the customer had the option 
either to buy DxR out or to release it from its contractual obligations. If it chose 
the former, it might do so just to obtain the intellectual property rights controlled 
by DxR. This option might permit DxR to start up again in the medical education 
marketplace, but without its biggest customer and much of its intellectual 
property.  With either the restart or release option, DxR would need to adapt to 
the major change in orientation. The change would encourage DxR to identify 
new customers and new product opportunities and create new strategic 
alliances.  If any of these options resulted in further growth, Myers knew that 
some of his management team felt more rigorous procedures were necessary for 
software development and human resource management. Myers also felt that 
DxR's pharmaceutical partner needed to be making greater use of the Internet for 
marketing, and perhaps distributing, DxR's products. 
 
Keywords: inter-organizational alliances, World Wide Web, project 
management, management of IT personnel, case study  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
DxR Development Group, located in Carbondale, Illinois, was the vision of 
Hurley Myers (Ph.D.), a member of the medical school faculty at Southern Illinois 
University (SIU). The SIU medical school was started in 1970 in reaction to the 
excessive research orientation then adopted in most American medical schools. 
The focus of SIU's medical school was quality teaching. Dean Richard Moy, the 
school's first Dean, explained: "It was time for reform and revolution in medical 
education. I recruited faculty who would be good teachers. And Hurley Myers 
was the quintessential teacher, the type of new Ph.D. that I wanted to attract. He 
was burning with ideas and the desire to teach". 
In the mid-1980s, the medical school was the first in the nation to institute 
a new learning process that was more problem-oriented. It partially relied on 
case booklets describing clinical situations. These cases were used to challenge 
a student's problem-solving skills. Myers felt this approach was a natural 
application for the computer as it would permit students to go down multiple 
paths during their analysis, and for faculty to trace the process by which a 
student arrived at a particular diagnosis and treatment plan. 
 Communications of AIS Volume 3, Article 5                    4 
DxR Case Study by C. Saunders and B. Ives  
 
 
Myers teamed up with Dr. Kevin Dorsey, an SIU clinical faculty member 
and physician who provided much of the content for the computerized case 
simulations. Myers assigned student laboratory assistants to create the 
computerized versions of the case. Using Hypercard, a new tool available only 
on Macintosh computers, the students developed several computerized cases 
that were based on content provided by Dorsey, Myers and others. Although still 
somewhat crude, the cases were well-accepted by faculty and students at SIU, 
as well as at conferences where Myers presented diagnostic simulations. 
 
AFFILIATION WITH MEDICAL SCHOOL 
 
Myers and Dorsey began discussions with the Dean of the Medical 
School, who was intrigued with the possibilities. The medical school, with strong 
encouragement from Dean Moy, had been involved in innovative education since 
its inception. Dean Moy saw  affiliation as a logical extension and agreed to 
provide funding if Myers could get supporting grants from external sources.  
Soon thereafter, Apple Computer provided a grant for hardware and Myers 
received a $30,000 grant from the Technological Commercialization Center 
(TCC), an Illinois agency designed to encourage high-tech start-up companies. 
Typically TCC funding had not been awarded to companies affiliated with a 
university, but the agency made an exception because it felt that the grant to 
DxR would promote TCC’s technology transfer goals.  Myers used the external 
grant money to hire Eldon Benz, a programmer whom he had met at a Macintosh 
user group, as well as a technical support person who was assigned to enter the 
clinical contents. 
  The first project was patient simulation software that allowed students to 
practice the patient encounter, conduct the examination, and order the laboratory 
work. Upon reviewing the students' actions, the professor could assess their 
clinical ability. 
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It soon became clear, however, that the cost to develop such a product 
could exceed the expected revenues. Worse, a shortfall in the budget of the 
State of Illinois led to a $500,000 cut in the Medical School's state funding. In 
early 1992, facing these financial hardships, the Dean was forced to reevaluate 
the use of foundation money for special projects, including the patient simulation 
project. He decided that: "Hurley’s fertile mind could spend any amount of money 
that I could give him. His ideas were good and he needed to be cut loose." 
But after cutting Myers' funding, the Dean negotiated an agreement with 
the university attorneys and transferred the product's intellectual property rights 
to Myers. In another gesture of support, he returned money already received 
from institutions seeking to buy the product from SIU, encouraging them to buy it 
directly from Myers instead. 
 
MOVING TO BUSINESS INCUBATOR 
 
Myers had already seen enough positive customer response to know that 
the product had potential. He formed a partnership with Dorsey and Benz. DxR 
Development Group, Inc. was incorporated in July 1992. The fledgling company 
used its TCC connections to rent a single room in the university's business 
incubator to set up shop. According to the forgiving agreement, the rent could 
slide a month or two as long as it was paid up at the end of the year. Using the 
university's phone system created additional savings.  Also, the location was 
convenient to Myers' classes. There were some caveats, however. For instance, 
the university attorney advised Myers to avoid having his calls from the business 
come to his faculty office and conducting other business-related activities there 
as these would be viewed as using the university to conduct his private business. 
 
II.FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTS 
 
DxR released the patient simulation software in 1992. The company's 
business plan projected continuing to develop the patient simulation software. 
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But the simulation software was not selling as well as the company's founders 
had hoped. Myers described his frustrations at the time: 
 
“It was obvious that we needed to find a product that everyone 
needed. While clinical simulations represented a good type of 
product, there were too many alternatives. Paper-based 
alternatives were readily available in the market. There were also 
problems because of the infrastructure of most medicalschools. 
The infrastructure to use the software as an integral part of 
curriculum was not in place. Medical schools could put it  out as 
part of a learning resource center but not as required assignments." 
 
It soon became clear that DxR would need another product to tide the firm 
over while that technological infrastructure was being developed. 
NETTER MEDICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
DxR's second product also grew out of Myers' teaching experience. A 
popular basic electrocardiography text in Myer's cardiovascular medicine class 
featured artwork by a very well known medical illustrator, Dr. Frank Netter. The 
text was one of the best selling books about electrocardiography in the world. 
The pharmaceutical company, CibaGeigy, owned Netter's illustrations and the 
collection was valued at approximately $40 million dollars. 
 
Myers described the germination of DxR's second product: 
 
"I was on my way to a class and it occurred to me that Netter's text 
on basic electrocardiography would be a wonderful book to put on a 
disk. I called the right guy at the right time – he gave me $2,500 to 
create an illustration of what could be done. I needed the money to 
pay the programmer. I parlayed that into a $150,000 investment 
before it was over." 
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After that class, Myers picked up the phone and called the manager of the 
medical education program, Phil Flagler, at Ciba Geigy. With that call, DxR laid 
the cornerstone of a relationship with CibaGeigy, and later with Novartis, formed 
from the merger of Ciba Geigy and Sandoz. 
THE INTERACTIVE ATLAS OF HUMAN ANATOMY 
DxR's next digital product, the Interactive Atlas of Human Anatomy, was 
completed in a record time of eight months and was even more successful than 
the commercially viable Interactive Electrocardiography CD. This atlas added 
value to the best-selling book illustrations was its provision of navigational tools 
and educational features. German and Portuguese versions were subsequently 
started. The success of the original interactive atlas prompted the development 
of two other atlas projects: The Interactive Atlas of Clinical Anatomy and the 
Interactive Atlas of the Central Nervous System Anatomy. The Central Nervous 
System capitalized on earlier versions of the Interactive Atlas of Human 
Anatomy. DxR was able to pull out portions relating to the central nervous 
system to develop give-away products that Novartis Pharmaceuticals could use 
at trade shows. DxR anticipated developing cardiovascular, rheumatology, and 
respiratory atlases using earlier products as models.  
In building the interactive clinical atlas in 1996 and 1997, DxR pushed the 
Wintel platform development tool, Toolbook, to the limits. The clinical atlas was 
quadruple the size of the original product and Toolbook did not scale up well with 
the increased data requirements. Furthermore, DxR developers found previously 
unencountered bugs in the tool. They were in frequent contact with Asymetrix, 
the developer of Toolbook, who kept reassuring them that the size limit, while 
untested, was much higher than DxR's requirement. DxR was in the eleventh 
hour and concerned that it would be unable to deliver the atlas on time. 
DxR did not disclose its plight to Novartis until the deadline neared. Robert 
Wright, DxR’s project director for the clinical atlas, felt caught in the middle. 
Members of his team were upset because Novartis had not previously been 
informed about the problems. Furthermore, the team members were being 
pressured by management who had described this as "do or die" for DxR. The 
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team did find work-arounds for Toolbook's limitations, but exceeded their 
deadline. 
Meanwhile, Novartis had outsourced the development of a marketing 
demo for the Clinical Atlas Version 1.0 to an advertising company. For this demo, 
the advertising company developed a self-running presentation describing the 
Clinical Atlas. However, Myers, who had not been informed that another 
company was developing the demo, was disappointed that it was not interactive. 
Version 1.1 of the atlases, including fixes of Version 1.0's bugs, followed 
immediately on the heels of Version 1.0. Major changes in medical terminology 
motivated the next version of the clinical and human anatomy atlases. DxR 
started Version 2.0 in October of 1997 and it was finished, according to the 
original specifications, on February 1, 1998. DxR coordinated its work with that of 
the Novartis staff who were making similar changes to the book version. Since 
Novartis was short on staff, the product's delivery date was pushed back. The 
version release was further delayed by Novartis to add functionality that 
permitted users to see the female anatomy from a number of views (e.g.,MRI, top 
down, Netter diagram).  The Clinical Atlas Version 2.0 was restarted in April and 
finally completed on April 24, 1998. In 1998, the Software Publishers Association 
nominated the product for the "Best Debut of the Year." 
OTHER PRODUCTS 
Other products (Appendix A) soon joined the DxR patient simulation and 
Atlas series software. The Postclerkship Examination (PCX), customized 
examination software developed for SIU's fourth year medical students, was a 
derivative product of DxR patient simulation software. Atlas derivatives such as 
the Interactive Atlas of the Central Nervous System were specially designed for 
Novartis' Pharmaceutical Division, and atlases in German and Portuguese were 
developed. In the summer of 1998, DxR undertook a project about congestive 
heart failure as part of the NovaCon series. Other projects, such as products on 
diabetes and irritable bowels, were scheduled to join the series. In addition to 
products designed for Novartis, DxR produced third party products for such 
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groups as the Mayo Clinic and Northstar Hospital. (Appendix B describes this 
project  further and Appendix C describes  the technical support role.) 
 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
 
By the summer of 1998, DXR employed 23 people on a full and part-time 
basis. Figure 1 shows the organization chart at that time The President and 
cofounder of DxR Group, Inc. is Hurley Myers. Two people (in addition to the 
secretary) report to him: cofounder and Vice President of Programming, Eldon 
Benz, and Vice President of Production, Robert Wright. The four software 
engineers and two technical support staff report to Eldon Benz, while the three 
graphics artists, audio support person, editorial support person and four project 
directors with their software support personnel report to Robert Wright. Note that 
by Summer 1998, Dorsey had sold his share of the business to Hurley Myers.  
The staff worked in a mixed computing environment as most products 
needed to be made available for both Wintel and Macintosh platforms because 
the latter was still in heavy use in many educational institutions. Each project had 
a development team comprised of editors, graphic designers, programmers, 
customer support personnel, and individuals with medical experience and led by 
a project director. Robert Wright, as Vice President of Production, oversaw the 
group responsible for developing content. Eldon Benz, one of the co-founders, 
was in charge of programming, though he was most familiar with the Macintosh 
environment.  
 
Process and human resource issues constrained the development environment. 
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Figure 1. Organization Chart 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS     
Deadlines 
DxR prided itself on its development speed. However, there were 
challenges to completing projects on schedule. Richard Klein, the previous head 
of the medical education division at Novartis explained,   
 
"The biggest problem for my folks was timelines. DxR's timelines 
came and went. This is probably because Hurley was overly 
optimistic about timelines. We had to give distributors six months 
notice so they could promote the products in their catalogs. I was 
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unhappy when we did not meet the promised timelines. This 
happened a few times and then we started building in buffers." 
 
Deadlines were also a major source of frustration for DxR staff. Robert Wright, 
Vice President of Production, explained: 
 
"At first, DxR didn't give estimates about how long it would take to 
develop a product since they had never developed a similar one. 
DxR found it difficult to make good estimates. More recently, 
Novartis tends to set a date that is often driven by marketing needs. 
But then, either because there is no pressure at their end or 
because we need the time, they give us an extension. That is 
disheartening to our people who had worked hard to meet the initial 
deadline. Novartis gives us a date and then changes it. Now I am in 
contact with people at Novartis, so we have a better sense of what 
is happening." 
 
Craig Yarwood, Novartis’ liaison with DxR from 1996 to 1998, confirmed 
that Novartis' actions impacted DxR's deadlines. He explained: "DxR's delays to 
deadlines were due to a number of factors. One was the lack of upfront definition 
on Novartis' end. But DxR was flexible. They desired to make the product the 
best that it could be. In publishing, you can go on forever when trying to improve 
the product." Yarwood wanted to build enough time into the schedule to review 
the product adequately prior to release. 
Access 
The artwork to be included in an atlas was first designated by a content 
specialist - for instance, a particular view of a heart appearing in the hardcopy 
version of the atlas. Novartis personnel were informed of the need and then 
retrieved the artwork based upon the content specialist's specifications. 
Unfortunately, several Novartis employees who were familiar with the artwork 
had retired or been reassigned. Those individuals who were still available had to 
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drive about half an hour to reach the collection which was stored offsite. They 
would then forward the artwork to DxR where it was digitized. In lieu of experts, 
the custodians relied on registration numbers in a paper catalog. In DxR's first 
atlas, registration numbers were not mentioned. The content persons went 
through all their books and requested artwork as, "I wanted the image that 
appears as plate xxx on page xxx of book YYY." When the Clinical Atlas was 
developed, the lack of registration numbers became an acute problem and 
contributed to delays.  
 
 
 
 
 
Finding a particular piece of art among the 5,000 piece collection 
presented another accessibility challenge. Novartis custodians had not always 
returned artwork to its proper location after it had been digitized or photographed. 
Some parts of the collection were indefinitely on loan, while still others were 
damaged. 
D&R had similar problems with many of its own files. Wright admitted, 
ruefully: 
 
"We have learned the hard way that we have to organize lots of 
things better – not just art, but also source code and so on.  
Everything is backed up. The majority of the work in progress 
including the digital images has been archived. You can do a text 
search to find out what CD something is on, but the indexing is 
minimal." 
 
Wright wanted to develop a relational database to be shared by all of the 
DxR staff. Information about artwork identified so far included: name, storage 
location, project used on, changes and layer. The need for a good indexing 
Registration 
Registration is a technical term that refers to the number used to 
index a piece of art in the Netter collection.  
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system for artwork had become painfully clear in attempts to reuse the graphics 
interface from a version created two-years previously for a Portuguese version of 
the atlas. Wright explained: 
 
"To modify the language of the interface the developers needed to 
find an icon strip that is still in layers, and then change the text 
component. For instance, in the original PhotoShop artwork, the 
text elements of the interface appear on different layersthan would 
the color of the button or its shape. But, the layered images take up 
massive amounts of space, so only the "flattened" version is 
actually stored on the product CD. The flattened version can not be 
easily updated, while the layered one is simple to change. But, 
when we go into the archive to look for the layered version we may 
find a hundred different icon strips from the same project." 
 
Patrick Forer, a member of the DxR Technical Support staff, echoed Wright’s 
concerns about accessibility in an interview: 
 
"We don't have a consistent way of storing source code or images.  
We have a server, but it is a garbage heap. We have never had a 
priority for thinking about our data. People have multiple versions 
and may not know which is the best one. You may not necessarily 
want the most recent version as an older version may have 
eventually been used instead. Naming conventions are vague.  
There are over 200 CDs in the archives. We are trying to create a 
comprehensive policy. However, we do not yet have an integrated 
approach to managing and storing data. We have patched together 
an approach, but it is not planned at the highest level. We have not 
invested energy in it. We waste a lot of time in-house."  
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Controls 
A third development challenge focused on controls. Although, as shown in 
the Organization Chart in Figure 1, the chain of command was clear-cut, controls 
at DxR were relatively loose. One team member noted, "There is a big learning 
curve for all our employees, and much is demanded of them."  
Wright felt that tighter controls could lead to poor morale: 
 
"People have to pitch in to do a job. They give up their free time. 
When the project is done, we hope that people will have some 
ownership of it. People get excited about what they are doing. For 
better or worse, we are a little less disciplined than you might have 
expected. This is a dangerous way of doing things, in my opinion. 
The hardest thing in my job is that there are certain areas where we 
need very strict controls – say, in backup. We have lost major time, 
because things were not properly backed up, or cataloged. This 
looseness worked out very well when I was first here and there 
were half the number of people. But, the more we grow, the more 
difficult it is to maintain that enjoyable atmosphere. We have less 
and less overlap, where people are aware of what one another is 
doing. This makes it more of a problem when people leave." 
 
Forer thought some things were being left to too late in the product 
development cycle. 
 
"Deadlines are much too short for managing the projects. A lot of  
time the engineers are focused on their project so they let slide the 
development of the utilities the customer uses to set up the product 
on their own computer. Often they will do that on the last day and 
then we see the products going out with problems. I think it is a 
mistake to have the first thing the customer is going to see be 
completed on the last day before the product is shipped." 
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Testing and release control were also identified as problems by Forer: 
 
"The testing process is too informal. Unfortunately, no one is 
assigned to it and it occurs too late in the process. And, there is no 
release control; sometimes we turn new releases out two or three 
times a day." 
 
 While the lack of project controls created problems, it was consistent with 
Myers' philosophy of "creative disorganization." Myers explained:  
 
"When decisions are being made on a day-to-day basis about what 
should be included in a particular product, everyone has an 
opportunity to participate. We only define upfront about 20 to 30% of 
the specification. We don't go into a room and tell people how it will 
be. Rather, we go into a room and let everyone have an opportunity 
to participate in the design. I have the final decision and if what they 
want to do is as good or better than what I wanted to do, then we do 
it their way. If, on the other hand, I see positive long-term 
implications of doing it another way, then we do that. People from 
the outside, including our editors at Novartis, see this as problem. 
They are looking for someone who is more traditional in the process 
of software development." 
 
Richard Klein, president of Novartis from 1995 to 1996, encouraged Myers 
to perpetuate the loose project structure: "The employees were happy working in 
a loose environment. I think DxR would have gone down the wrong route with 
more structure. You want a Bill Gates kind of environment. Where is that fine line 
that lets people be creative?" 
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Coordination 
Content specialists were often located remotely from DxR, as were its 
editors at Novartis. So too were the individuals responsible for retrieving the 
Netter artwork. Novartis editors interfaced, on many projects, between DxR and 
content specialists. Even within DxR's own environment, coordination became 
more difficult as the product mix became more complex and additional people 
were hired. 
 
As Novartis president, Richard Klein worked to promote coordination between 
DxR and Novartis: 
 
"We found early on that when you are physically separated like 
we were there had to be a process of communication. People had to 
be empowered to communicate. We tried to make the 
communication as direct as possible. I established project teams for 
marketed products and those in development. The teams included 
someone from DxR The teams would have meetings about once a 
week and communicate with the person at DxR over the phone." 
 
But Klein was quick to note problems with this coordination mechanism:  
 
"I am not suggesting for a minute that communications were ideal. Hurley 
has very young people who are not experienced in these things. But once you 
start talking about project teams and business teams or making decisions that go 
beyond your expertise it becomes more difficult. Hurley couldn't be our only 
contact. Everyone in my group was trying to call Hurley. This was neither efficient 
nor effective." 
 
Robert Wright wanted to improve DxR’s approach to project management. 
But he wasn’t sure whether improvements could be made without inhibiting 
DxR’s creativity or making it more difficult to work on projects with Novartis. 
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Human Resources 
Staffing was another challenge. In the Carbondale market, DxR faced 
difficulties finding applicants with programming experience. Many were former 
students or spouses of students or faculty. 
 
Ray Lenzi, Director of the business incubator, concurred that many 
prospective employees were spouses who had found themselves captured in 
Southern Illinois. Increasingly though, Carbondale had become an option for 
people who graduate from universities, especially SIU. He explained, "The lower 
salaries and less urbanization must be balanced against the lower cost of living, 
lack of crowding, and beautiful environment. The conundrum is that economic 
development in rural areas leads to urbanization that isless appealing to those in 
the area." 
 
Many people hired by DxR as programmers did not have computer 
backgrounds. And, one graphics artist who did not have previous computer 
experience admitted, "I saw this job advertised in the paper. I didn't think they 
would hire me because I didn't know how to turn on the computer. And they hired 
me, much to my surprise. It has been an incredible learning experience. I learn 
something on a daily basis. ….. I absolutely love my job. I'm incredibly lucky to be 
in southern Illinois and have a job like this. It makes me feel good to be 
developing health education media." 
 
Muriel Rice's experience was very similar. An interview with her is 
included as  Appendix D.   
Since the new hires typically did not have the requisite skills and 
experience, Wright felt a 90-day probationary period was critical. However, he 
also felt that DxR had not always used clear objectives in managing new hires. 
New hires knew generally what was required of them, but specificity was often 
missing. Wright explained: 
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"Myers always makes it clear what he expects of them, but he gives 
them an overview rather than specific instructions. Without clear 
objectives, in concert with adequate training, it is difficult to provide 
objective performance reviews. Because of his teaching 
background, Myers shepherds everyone. He wants to bring the 
best out in all of us and to develop skills in new employees. As long 
as they are willing to learn and excited about what they are doing, 
Myers supports them." 
 
Wright felt this made it difficult for him to establish discipline and controls. 
 
DxR also applied for several grants with matching funds for training 
purposes. Ray Lenzi helped DxR ("an incubator dream") write a training grant 
proposal that was turned down by the State of Illinois because DxR was not a 
manufacturing company. In the summer of 1998 he helped DxR write another 
grant to cover the direct cost of training and travel to the training site. 
 
IV. NOVARTIS/DXR ALLIANCE 
 
PHIL FLAGLER YEARS (1992-1995) 
 
The Novartis/DxR alliance underwent considerable change since its 
inception. Myers had worked well with Novartis' Phil Flagler for a year and a half 
until Flagler took early retirement in 1995. "When Phil Flagler retired, I thought it 
was the end of road there for us," said Myers. "But, I called and got the name of 
Phil's replacement, Richard Klein, and set up a meeting. It was not a particularly 
good one. He was a financial expert who knew little about publishing. He was 
interested in the business side. This wasn't surprising as this was one of the few 
pharmaceutical companies that had a medical education arm, mainly because of 
the Frank Netter illustrations" 
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RICHARD KLEIN YEARS (EARLY 1995-1996) 
 
Richard Klein faced a daunting task when he took over Flagler’s position 
as Executive Director of Novartis’ Medical Education and Publication Division. . 
His charge was to turn a division that was consuming millions of dollars into a 
profitable unit. At the time, the medical education division was a support function 
and its publications were being given away to physicians as a marketing tool. 
 
Klein felt that he and Myers complemented one another very well. Klein 
provided Myers with insights about business issues while Myers educated Klein 
about the technology. Eventually Myers persuaded Klein to evaluate the 
automated atlas's potential. After careful consideration, Klein decided to pursue 
the basic cardiovascular package. With CibaGeigy's financial support, DxR 
developed a product with commercial potential. The product did well in the 
medical education market. DxR's modest profit from the product substituted for 
equivalent funding CibaGeigy had contracted to provide to DxR. DxR profits were 
plowed back into the business.  
 
Klein's belief in the product pushed aside his earlier skepticism. He 
became DxR's greatest champion at Novartis. He supported DxR and its creative 
ability, even though privately he occasionally chastised Myers. He worked with 
Myers to write a three-year contract (described in Appendix E) that benefited 
both DxR and Novartis.  
 
CRAIG YARWOOD YEARS (1996 TO LATE 1998) 
 
In 1996, Klein unexpectedly left Novartis. Peter Carlin was brought in from 
the outside to replace him. Craig Yarwood, a recent MBA graduate who also has 
a MS in Pharmacology, reported to Carlin and became Myers's new contact. 
Yarwood proved to be even more interested in the bottom line than Richard Klein 
had been. Yarwood was also interested in instilling more control into the 
development process. 
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Yarwood spoke very positively about the DxR/Novartis Alliance:  
 
"From Novartis' perspective, DxR has been an invaluable partner in 
helping position Ciba and Novartis in medical education…Novartis is now 
not only in the traditional book market, etc, but also it is increasingly 
technologically competent and leverages different media in the 
educational process." 
 
"One of the strengths and weaknesses (or now an opportunity of the 
relationship with DxR) is that DxR in multimedia development processes 
works with a thought process that is very different from the traditional 
publication model. There is a dichotomy in the way DxR and Novartis 
develop products. 
 
“To clarify what I mean about the dichotomy let me give you an example. 
In the publishing industry, products are developed around manuscripts 
received from authors. You work with author and there is no intermediary. 
In multimedia publishing, though, there is an added element. You have to 
work with both the author and the instructional designer. Early in 
multimedia product design, we had tried to apply the publishing approach 
to a non-linear publication. Novartis' strength is being able to battle 
through the traditional editorial approach. Originally it was difficult to lay 
out patterns and content with the traditional approach. This is improving 
with every new project. 
 
“Early on this dichotomy was a detriment. The two companies didn't 
understand each other. Now the two companies have capitalized on the 
differences and the dichotomy is perceived as an opportunity. They are 
more closely aligned now. They know each other's strengths and 
weaknesses.” 
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“Without their partnership, neither DxR nor Novartis would have evolved to 
its current level. Although I have indicated a challenging development 
process exists, it is because of this intellectual tug of war that the end 
products are generally considered superior to anything similarly available." 
 
STRESS IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
Despite the benefits derived from the DxR/Novartis alliance, Wright saw 
signs of stress in the relationship in early 1998: 
 
"As far as I know, there is no money being spent on marketing the  
DxR company. When Novartis web site went online, we weren't  
mentioned. That was pretty disappointing. There have been a lot of 
hints recently that Novartis wants to sever our relationships." 
 
Cofounder Benz also predicted that a change in the Novartis relationship 
was likely "because of change in Novartis' focus… change in personnel; perhaps 
they don't see the benefits of having their name on computer software." 
In the spring of 1998 Novartis dropped a bombshell on DxR. As Myers 
explained: 
 
"The folks at Novartis had been making a lot of noise about how 
tough the market was and how their business was changing. While I 
was in a meeting with Craig Yarwood in Tampa, he suggested 
Novartis was going to cut back on development of new products ---- 
a move that would directly impact our budget. A couple of days later 
Craig called to tell me Novartis had mandated a 20% across the 
board cut because two drugs were not doing as well as they had 
expected. In addition to our budget cut, we would now lose potential 
add on business from pharmaceutical divisions businesses that 
would not be as willing to pay for value-added products." 
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Yarwood also indicated that Novartis' and DxR's different development 
process had created some stress in the relationship. He described DxR's 
'creative disorganization' as "exasperating, frustrating and exhilarating all at the 
same time. DxR had provided a novel approach to development which has 
facilitated Novartis' development growth. At the same time, the injection of 
Novartis' publication and editorial experience has put more structure into the DxR 
development process. But we're still not entirely on the same page. DxR tends to 
develop a project more on the fly. Novartis tends to use more of a traditional 
publishing project approach." 
 
Yarwood perceived that DxR did not use the storyboard approach typically 
used at Novartis, and that usually only 10% of DxR’s projects were specified prior 
to the start of programming. Novartis wanted a larger percentage, say 75%, to be 
established prior to the start of the programming effort. 
 
QUALITY PRODUCT AT LOW COST 
 
Myers felt that DxR was able to deliver quality products at a lower cost 
than most of its competitors. Klein concurred with Myers' assessment. He said, 
"There is no doubt in my mind that DxR was the high quality, low price provider. I 
know what DxR paid people. It is somewhat apples and oranges to compare 
salaries where I live in New Jersey to Southern Illinois. Hurley's people we re 
working 18 hours a day and sleeping over, trying to make deadlines. They were 
producing high quality materials at a good price." 
 
In early 1997, Novartis decided to digitize and catalog over 5000 Netter 
paintings. Novartis put out for bid a project to create a digital screen and print 
version of the collection. DxR put in a bid to do part of the project. Wright 
described the result: 
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"We were probably the lowest bidder, but we were not considered. 
We did not have the equipment or experience. They hired a 
company to do some of the work, but apparently did not give out 
the entire contract. It appears that the project has turned out to be  
a much more expensive proposition than Novartis expected. Last 
week they told us that they're now thinking of going out for a     new 
supplier. They want print quality as well as multi-media, so the 
project would be very expensive – perhaps as much as $1,000,000. 
Of course, we could use the equipment on other projects." 
 
Novartis had done more than bankroll DxR's product development. In 
1997, Novartis decided it could make a profit by distributing and collecting sales 
revenues for DxR's simulation product. To make the product profitable, Novartis 
raised the price of the entire series of 58 cases from $15,000 to $40,000, or 
$1,000 a case. Myers was not enthusiastic, but thought that the support to 
maintain the product, in addition to the royalties that DxR received, offset the 
disadvantages of the price increase. Novartis undertook an extensive marketing 
campaign and planned first year sales of $200,000. Instead, it realized gross 
revenues of $240,000, of which DxR's share was $100,000. This money was 
used for maintaining the current software and developing new cases. 
Myers devoted considerable efforts to maintain the alliance with Novartis. 
As the contract with Novartis neared the end of its life, he wondered what 
strategy he should adopt for DxR’s future. He knew he needed to decide the 
extent to which DxR’s future would be linked to Novartis. 
 
MEDICAL EDUCATION SOFTWARE MARKET 
 
Both DxR and Novartis were aware of the inherent risks of the medical 
software market. Wright described the competitive environment:  
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"The market is small and there are lots of competitors developing 
software products." 
 
DxR's main competitors were Adam Software, Gold Standard and IVI 
Publishing. Adam was a publicly traded firm with a product characterized by 
expensive artwork. Gold Standard was founded by an MD with an initial interest 
in anatomy. Its main product used cadaver pictures and labels. Interestingly, 
Gold Standard in the spring of 1998 began marketing and selling Novartis 
software, including that produced by DxR. Gold Standard developed, published 
and distributed medical education software. 
In addition, many small companies with innovative products using the 
visible human data had sprouted up. The visible human data was obtained from 
a federally funded project. Researchers at the University of Colorado, funded by 
a grant from the National Library of Medicine, took thousands of high-quality, 
digital pictures of slices, about every millimeter, of a male's and female’s body. 
The man, who had been executed for murder, donated his body to science. 
The visible human data was readily available over the Internet at no 
charge. Several companies were using it to create value-added products. Gold 
Standard was using the data to produce a virtual human studio that allowed a 
viewer to define a region or organ and pull it out as a three-dimensional model 
that can then be looked at in a variety of ways. 
DxR was also using the visible human data in their products. They paid 
less than $500 for a CD that had all the high-resolution axial (top down) cuts. 
Through a computer-based process, DxR then developed other views of the 
data. Novartis quickly learned the benefits of providing more cross-sectional 
data. But observers felt that, the real value of their products is derived from the 
Netter illustrations. 
To compete in this tight market, DxR realized the potential benefits of 
alliances. But, it was difficult to find alliance prospects, either long-term clients or 
partners, with ideas and deep pockets. However, alliance prospects were not 
totally out of the picture. Myers described one major client: 
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"We were contacted by an emerging biotech company called 
Cephalon which engineers enzymes and genes to produce 
healthcare products. Cephalon was working on a product called 
Myotropin to treat Lou Gehrig's disease. Cephalon wanted us to 
work with a famous neurologist to support the marketing of their 
new product. They were willing to pay $250,000 for it and we could 
do it for  considerably less than that amount. Then, the FDA 
squashed their product. I charged them for just our time, $10,000, 
which surprised them. I told them we wanted their future business." 
 
IV. DXR  AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB 
 
By the summer of 1998, DxR had become interested in exploiting the 
World Wide Web. Wright wanted to set up a DxR website, which he felt would be 
an inexpensive way to promote DxR as an entity separate from Novartis. The 
website could capitalize on DxR's reputation as a medical education software 
specialist. However, he saw some hurdles to be overcome in using the web as a 
distribution channel, as he described: 
 
"Our products are so large (some as big as 650 megabytes) that 
they would require days to download. I have been going to 
Software Publishing Association conferences. There, they always 
discuss what is an acceptable size for downloading, given current 
bandwidth limitations. The acceptable size is slowly getting larger 
with new connections and technology. People are more and more 
willing to wait. At the upper limit, people will download a 15 or 20 
megabyte file. But, most of our products are over 100 megabytes. 
This may be too large. And the time required to download is not the 
only factor. Connection problems during the download might mean 
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that you have to start over a number of times before you are 
successful." 
 
A number of other hurdles existed for DxR. One of the greatest was 
obtaining Novartis's permission. Novartis wanted to protect the software and 
avoid piracy. At the same time, Novartis didn't want to upset its distributors or 
customers. 
DxR’s Wright proposed to Novartis both marketing via the web and using 
‘Try and Buy’ technology. The latter required offering customers a demo of the 
full working product on the disk. A customer could use the product for a number 
of days, or sign-ons, or usage of modules. The software would provide a unique 
number that DxR could use to produce a key. A customer could call, fax, or 
contact DxR via the web to get the key to open the full working version. 
 
Though the technology that Wright proposed was rather simple, it would 
require DxR hiring people to handle calls and provide support. But, Novartis' 
concern about Wright's informal suggestion was different. Many student 
customers used the software at both home and school. Novartis wanted to let 
them use it on multiple computers without a second license. Wright's suggested 
solution would only provide a license for one machine. 
 
Myers also saw problems in exploiting the full advantage of the web: 
 
"Most of our products incorporate digital video, digit sound, and 
color graphics. They were designed to work best off CD. Under 
these circumstances, these products would not perform well over 
the web." 
 
Myers saw an additional problem. DxR had tried unsuccessfully to sell the 
continuing education software directly to individual doctors. DxR had lowered the 
price from $100 to $25. Unfortunately, a case was not like a reference book. 
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Once a doctor solved the problem it, it was no longer useful. Myers considered 
selling the individual cases online as a service, but encountered major technical 
problems. Most of DxR's software had been designed for a 640 by 480 screen 
size that, if accessed through a web browser, would require either a big monitor 
or scrolling windows in the browser. Further, many organizations were moving 
towards intranet delivery whereas DxR's programs were set up to be delivered 
from a server. Lastly, there were copyright issues. DxR and Novartis separately 
owned the various copyrights for different elements of their joint products: 
Novartis owned the Netter illustrations and DxR owned the software copyright, 
icons, and interface design. 
Myers knew distributing DxR’s products over the Internet presented many 
challenges. He wondered if the World Wide Web could be used to successfully 
distribute DxR’s products. He also wondered if DxR could use the Internet in 
other ways. 
 
Editor’s Note: This case was received on September 1, 1999. It was with the authors for revision 
for approximately three months.   The case was published on March 14, 2000. 
 
APPENDIX A 
                                DXR PRODUCT LINE, 1998 
 
INTERACTIVE PATIENT SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
 
This is high-level simulation, "problem-based learning" software. The 
Diagnostic Reasoning line facilitates teaching, learning and the evaluation of all 
key skills related to clinical problem solving. Fifty-eight real patient simulation 
cases are available that cover a broad range of therapeutic areas. This line has 
the most potential for multiple uses: academic practice and testing tool, learning 
tool, physical simulation game for physicians, customized cases for managed 
care, pharmaceutical marketing tool, and continuing education. The first case 
was developed in 1992 and additional cases are still being developed. The cases 
are available only as a site license. The simulation template was modified to 
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produce the Post-Clerkship Examination (PCX) for fourth year med students at 
SIU. 
THE BOOK ON DISK 
 
The atlas series repackages existing content found in Novartis' atlas products. 
Educational features are provided in an interactive mode to use the book content 
more effectively. DxR has developed the following products in this line. 
1. Interactive Atlas of Human Anatomy 
[Version 1.0, August 1996; Version 1.1, late 1996; Version 2.0,1998; Price: 
$99.95] 
This  multimedia version of the  leading anatomy atlas is flexible, interactive and 
easyier to use with  a visual search index, audio pronunciation of labels, 
electronic user's manual, 900 full-color illustration, detail magnification 
capabilities, and ability to view illustrations with or without labels. It may be used 
on Macintoshes or with Windows. Versions are available in English, German and 
Portuguese. 
2. Interactive Atlas of Clinical Anatomy 
[Version 1.0 - July 1997; Version 2.0 – April 1998; Price: $199.95] 
This CD-ROM draws from all illustrations in Netter's Atlas of Human Anatomy, as 
well as illustration from the 12-book Netter Collection of Medical Illustrations. This 
product was nominated for the prestigious 1998 Codie Award for the Best Debut 
of the Year by the Software Publishers Association. It contains: 
 
· Over 1,200 full-color Netter illustrations 
· Nearly 2,000 compare screens of normal vs. clinical anatomy with 
· explanatory text 
· 1,800 cross sections from the Visible Human project 
· 237 CT scans, MRIs and X-rays 
· On-line help and tutorial movies 
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3. Interactive Atlas of the Central Nervous System 
 
Basic content and clinical material for a particular disease is brought 
together in multidimensional format in the NovaCon Disease Education Series. 
This series uses video, audio, text, animation and pictures to tell the story. For 
example, "peel away" layers of the coronary artery demonstrate its parts. And the 
viewer may watch the development of atherosclerotic plaque, as well as videos 
of the coronary artery during the angiography procedures. The CD-ROM has self 
test examinations and relatively simple navigation features. The Coronary Heart 
Disease module is the first in the series. A new disease module is scheduled to 
be completed every six months. The Congestive Heart Failure module was 
undertaken in the summer of 1998 and modules on hypertension, diabetes and 
irritable bowels are scheduled to follow. The Coronary Heart Disease module is 
priced at $69.95 and the Congestive Heart Failure and Hypertension modules will 
sell for $79.95 and $89.95, respectively. The set of three is priced at $195.00. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS 
 
This category includes customized products for the pharmaceutical 
divisions and products completed for third party groups such as the Infections 
Disease Control CD-ROM completed in May, 1998 for Northstar Hospital. 
 
APPENDIX B 
ANATOMY OF A PROJECT: NORTHSTAR HOSPITAL 
 
PROJECT INITIATION 
 
Northstar project involved developing a certification product for the 
continuing education of physicians in New York state. The product provided 
information about infectious disease control. DxR had worked on a project with 
one of the physicians at Northstar. He had been so pleased with the results of 
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that project that he referred DxR to a woman in charge of the New York 
certification program. In early 1998, the woman contacted Hurley Myers. To 
determine the price for the Northstar product, Myers came up with an estimate 
and then doubled it. The project was initiated when Northstar sent him a check 
for the first half of the price, which was essentially the original estimate. 
The Northstar project was demanding because it was a three-month rush 
job and because everything had to be approved by a committee in New York. 
The committee members had many opinions about how the product should look 
and their opinions extended beyond content. Myers encouraged this because he 
believed that it increased ownership in the end product. 
 
PROJECT DIRECTOR 
 
The hierarchy for Northstar, like all DxR projects is well defined.  The project 
director made sure that the work was getting done and oversaw the work of the 
programmers. When necessary, the project director did technical work. Because 
of quick turnaround promised for the Northstar project, the programmers worked 
many long hours and weekends, and the project director pitched in to help. 
 
ENTER THE GRAPHICS DESIGNER 
 
The first step of the project involved coming up with a look….. a concept. 
Rita Barber, the graphics designer, came up with various alternatives for the 
interface. She did a mockup for the Northstar project so that it would be easier for 
the clients to see what the product would be like. In this process she admitted 
that she received a lot of help. 
 
Barber's office has a glass wall onto a main hallway. She noted: " People 
have freedom here to come in and tell you what to do. We never design anything 
on our own. We have freedom to make suggestions. We never develop anything 
in isolation." 
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Barber continued: "We start with something and then send out screen 
shots. We just drag people in here, or present ideas to the core group. Of course, 
Hurley has ideas and the client has ideas. And we get ideas from the people 
here." 
Four or five concepts were sent to Northstar. But the Northstar contact 
had a clear idea of what he wanted. He wanted a "Power Point look" with a bright 
blue background and gold buttons. Barber added, "We were not at all happy with 
the interface they chose." But the customer had the final say, and the product 
was developed in accordance with the wishes of the committee. 
Barber was well into the development when a project director came in and 
told her: "You should see the buttons on Windows. They are too dark." 
Barber was developing on a Macintosh computer because of its strong 
graphics capabilities. The Windows version does not have the opacity of the 
Macintosh, nor does it have as wide a range of colors. Barber can only use 16 
base colors on the Windows version, and she noted that none of them are flesh-
colored. Soft colors are available on the Macintosh. Barber can set the gamma 
version on her machines so they correspond to the Windows version. When she 
checked the Windows version as suggested, Barber found that the colors were 
too dark and she worked to lighten them. This required major changes to the 
palettes of basic colors used in the icons and backgrounds. 
 
ENTER THE MULTIMEDIA TEXT EDITOR 
 
Muriel Rice, the multimedia text editor had been hired in November. 
Northstar was her second project at DxR. Like the other DxR personnel assigned 
to Northstar, she worked long hours and she worked five weekends in a row. 
The majority of Rice's time was spent reading the text authors have written 
in the context of the graphics and technical navigation. She said, "I tried to make 
sure everything fit together in a logical order. I made sure the flow was logical 
and intuitive. I also tested as I went along. I was not the primary person to do 
that, but since I was in there looking at the stuff already, it was reasonable for me 
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to do that. We all do that. Sometimes I needed to change the way things were 
written." 
 
FINISHING UP 
 
Patrick Forer and Tammy Fishback noted that testing is a major part of 
their job as Customer Service Representatives. They didn't have any 
specifications to let them know how the Northstar software was supposed to 
work. So when they had questions, they asked the product director, who couldn't 
always them. In those cases, the product director checked with the programmer. 
As a result, the testing of the Northstar software was both hurried and pretty 
shotgun in its approach. 
 
Barber did the last review before the Northstar software went out the door. 
She said, "We had banding at the bottom. The other graphics designer and I 
were livid, but the others couldn't see it." Since there was no time to get rid of the 
banding and still meet the deadline, the software was shipped. 
 
A week later, Myers received a call from the woman at the hospital who 
initiated the project. She was very pleased and told Myers that she had mailed 
the second half of the payment. Myers informed Novartis of the payment, and the 
routine check sent by Novartis was subsequently reduced by the amount of the 
payment. 
APPENDIX C 
A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A CUSTOMER SUPPORT PERSON AT 
DXR 
 
Note: This appendix is based on interviews of Patrick Forer and Tammy Fishback: May 1, 1998 
Tammy explains her view of the day of a DxR customer support representative: 
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 "There is no such thing as a typical day. We get 5-7 customer 
support calls a day that last on an average of 10 minutes each. In 
addition, our jobs include performing technical research needed to 
solve some of the more difficult problems; entering the data on the 
customer calls, communications, etc. in our database; producing 
reports; and assisting with technical problems around the office. 
This leaves some time to assist with projects to support the 
company. For instance, right now I am working on two databases: 
one to keep track of the software and related books we use to 
create our products, and a new customer support database from 
which we can more easily generate a variety of reports. Patrick and 
I are both part of a team which is analyzing our environment for a 
better solution to our company's daily backup routine and archiving 
system so that we can recover and find important data more 
consistently." 
 
 "We also pitch in as products are being developed whenever we 
have time. For instance, we spend time testing, using the software 
like a customer would, or systematically running through specific 
parts of the software which are likely to have problems. When we 
run across these "bugs," we document them on "bug sheets" which 
go to the project director for review and prioritization, then on to the 
programmer." 
 
"I enjoy the variety of work, the fact that we are always learning 
something, and being part of a team who are internally motivated to 
do the best work they can do. On a personal note, not having to 
dress formally every day is a breath of fresh air for me!" 
 
Patrick Forer adds a lengthy list of support activities: 
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  1. Setting up utilities and facilities 
  2. Running virus checking on a CD before it goes out. 
  3. Researching tools and techniques for development. 
  4. Maintaining and expanding the 10-Base-T corporate network. 
 5. Managing the file and mail servers. 
 6. Maintaining workstation hardware for most in-house users. 
 
Patrick elaborates on one important customer support activity: 
 
"You would be surprised about how many calls we get asking about 
reusing the images. People want to argue with us about their rights 
to export Netter images as clipart. Craig says, "we are not selling 
clip art." Novartis says "NO" officially, but for the right customers, 
they will be flexible so we don't have a firm policy. We have been 
told to pass requests for using images on to Novartis." 
 
"Requests come up several times a week. Novartis does have a 
permissions office (Barbara Berger) that decides if there will be a 
fee. The current image use request form is primarily for the Novartis 
Print Media (not our CD products) and needs to be modified to 
accommodate the electronic/multimedia age. They do have an 
electronic form for image use requests on the Novartis Med-Ed 
website." 
 
Testing is an important in-house function. 
 
"When we test, we don't have a specification to tell us how a 
product is supposed to work. So, we have to ask the product 
manager (director) who may not know either. He or she might then 
have to go check with the programmer. The Mac version is 
developed first, and serves as the standard. This lack of a target 
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specification can cause serious testing complications. It also makes 
testing interesting. We have pretty well heard there is not much of 
an interest in specifying the product in advance." 
 
"We (support reps) have every interest in not having things shipped 
until everything is ready because we have help the customer deal 
with the problem. Testing is a good way to learn the product." 
 
One aspect of the job that Patrick finds particularly difficult is archiving 
important data and files. We have made feeble attempts to standardize our file 
storage and naming conventions, but this has never really succeeded. 
 
“File storage and naming conventions are up to each project 
director. As support people we are supposed to help them archive 
important data. Robert and Hurley want this to happen more 
reliably, but I don't think we will have any success in this until we re-
dress the fundamental work flow processes." 
 
" I worked at a software publishing house in Ann Arbor Michigan 
called CText Inc. CText produces software for the newspaper 
publishing industry. They maintained a library log of recent 
revisions. This only works very effectively on reasonable sized files. 
It scans the copies and looks for changes. But our files with bit 
mapped data are too big. We have much more complex software. 
Our manual process of putting stuff on servers and naming them 
intelligently has never succeeded because of the nature of 
multimedia development." 
 
"Some of the workplace coordination complexities of multimedia 
development are: 
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  1. Large file sizes strain disk space, backup tape and network 
bandwidth. 
  2. This large file size makes versionizing changes to code difficult 
as  there are few tools on the market (like PVCS) which will handle 
large  project files consisting of integrated graphic, text, and source 
code. Thus, tracking intermediate changes to code are difficult and 
time consuming. 
  3. In-process project development files are frequently stored on 
workstations instead of a centralized fileserver. 
  4. This complicates file back and file management (though we do 
use Retrospect to backup workstation hard drives nightly). We 
have lost work multiple times because we failed to identify files as 
important and failed to back them up. 
  5. Post project archiving of files is difficult, time consuming, and 
error prone. If project files were accumulated on the file server, 
identifying them and archiving them to CD would be easy.” 
 
APPENDIX  D 
INTERVIEW WITH MURIEL RICE: 
EXPERIENCES OF A MULTIMEDIA TEXT EDITOR 
 
April 30, 1998 - I moved here from Boston last September--my husband 
got a teaching job. I am a writer. In college, I was the editor of an honors 
department literary journal. My degrees are in German and Anthropology. I 
edited, wrote, and translated educational medical manuals in my first job. In my 
most recent previous job, I also designed an interactive web site for a non-profit 
public policy research group. I was a German teacher in Germany before that. I 
moved here with only a few weeks notice, so I didn't know what kind of job 
market to expect. I ended up with an interview at this company only because 
someone had suggested that the incubator was supporting some very interesting 
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companies. The Director of the incubator was gracious enough to interview me 
and he immediately introduced me to Hurley, since he knew Hurley needed an 
editor and was working on a project in German. 
Hurley was the first person whom I interviewed with here in Carbondale 
who said, "Great! I'm so glad you came! You have skills and experience we could 
use here." I liked that! I had had four other interviews that week where people 
said, "What are you doing here? You haven't done this same job elsewhere, so 
we're not sure you could do it here." It is sometimes difficult for people to fit me 
into a strict job description because of my varied work experience and my 
Humanities degrees. They don't always appreciate that studying the Humanities 
trains people to think critically, communicate clearly, and develop research skills. 
Hurley looks for people with those skills. Many of the people here have so-called 
nontraditional backgrounds and it works out very well. It's a creative, intelligent 
group. 
Hurley asked me what I had done. He asked me to come back in with 
publications I had worked on. He asked me what I wanted to do, what my 
interests were. Hurley interviews everyone. I also talked with four or five people 
on the second trip. I took this job even though I could have made more money 
elsewhere. I took this job because it is exciting stuff and the staff looked 
cooperative and hard-working. 
Hurley appreciates things being done well. He tells people they have done 
a good job - also tells them when he is displeased. He explains why it would be 
better to do it another way. 
On my first day I noticed that people here had a very good sense of humor 
and four or five people came up and offered help. It was nice to feel so welcome. 
I knew I had to learn this software (Multimedia Director) really fast to keep up 
with them. 
I thought that I better start taking medical books home to catch up. I had to 
write something about hormone levels or the effects of hormone levels. I thought, 
I am going to have to read 6 medical books to write those five paragraphs to 
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elucidate the five paragraph titles that I was given. I've learned a lot while 
working here. 
The majority of my time is spent reading the text authors have written in 
the context of the graphics and technical navigation of the software. I try to make 
sure everything fits together in a logical order. I make sure information is 
presented in a way that a student at that level can get something out of it. I make 
sure that the information flow is logical and intuitive. There must be a fit between 
the text, graphics and logical flow. I also test the software functions as I go along. 
I am not the primary person to test, but since I am already looking at the 
products, it is reasonable for me to do it. We all do that. 
I also try to negotiate between the authors and the software side so 
everyone's needs are met. Sometimes I need to change the way things are 
written. Most people who write text, they are used to working in paper. 
Sometimes changes need to be made to accommodate the medium. With print 
text, for example, you can use footnotes and relay supplemental information that 
way. It works differently for multimedia. - sometimes you convert a footnote to a 
'hot' word (that's text you click on to get more text). Sometimes the note gets its 
own screen or a pull up window, or maybe it's best expressed as an image. 
APPENDIX E 
CONTRACT 
 
Richard Klein, in collaboration with Hurley Myers, developed a contract 
which was signed in October of 1995 by Myers and the President of CibaGeigy. 
The contract outlined the relationship including day to day management issues, 
work arrangements with third parties, and the exchange of money. It guaranteed 
an annual income to cover DxR costs with no more than twenty-five employees. 
From six months before to just after the contract expiration on January 1, 1999, 
Novartis had the option to buy up to 70% stake in DxR. If they choose not to buy, 
Novartis was required to provide an early notification. Speaking in the early 
summer of 1998, Myers said: 
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“Novartis' indications to us now seem to be that they are not going 
to buy us. That is our wish as well. We might be more secure if they 
did buy us, but they appear to now be focusing elsewhere." 
 
Richard Klein, who designed the three-year contract, explained the 
benefits of the relationship to DxR: Myers needed the financial security of those 
three years. "I don't think he could have survived at the staff level he reached. He 
got both stability and security for those three years." 
Klein continued, "He would develop a product and get a royalty on any 
sale. Half the royalties were his. The other half would buy down our liability for 
that period. We would give him say $800,000, and if he were getting a royalty it 
would be less." 
More specifically, if DxR won a third party contract that was approved by 
Novartis, 50% would go to Novartis, 40% would go to buying down the Novartis 
contracted amount, and 10% would be allocated for profit sharing. On products 
developed with Novartis, DxR would have a right to a royalty on it. 
But Klein also acknowledged the benefits of the contract to Novartis.  
 
"I wanted to tie Hurley down for a minimum of 3 years. I thought he 
was a pioneer in developing materials for the electronic platform. I 
wanted an honorable person. I wanted to have a supplier that I 
knew I could rely on.” 
 
"I took one look at the Atlas that my predecessor had developed 
and I said I would not market it as it was just a page turner on the 
computer. So I talked to Hurley about it and we agreed to develop a 
much more sophisticated scheme - it became one of the largest-
selling CDs in medical education in that first year it was released. 
That product was a money maker." 
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Myers assessed DxR's contribution to Novartis:  
 
"We bring two resources to the table. First, I am a front line 
educator who brings real medical education experience and I work 
closely on the projects. Second, we have a good team of 
developers." 
 
 
 
APPENDIX F 
CASE TIMELINE 
 
Timeline of Major DxR events 
Date Event 
Mid 1980s Kevin Dorsey and Hurley Myers create initial simulations for 
medical students at SIU. 
 Myers wins grants from Technological Commercialization 
Center (TCC) and Apple Computer to build simulations; 
Receives support from the SIU Medical School 
Spring 1992 Support discontinued from SIU Medical School 
July 1992 DxR Development Group, Inc. is incorporated by Myers, Benz 
and Dorsey and operations housed in incubator at SIU 
Fall 1992 Patient Simulation Software released by DxR Group, Inc. 
Fall 1992 Myers contacts Phil Flagler at CibaGeigy 
Winter 1995 Phil Flagler takes early retirement and is replaced by Richard 
Klein  
October 1995 Contract negotiated by Klein and Myers is signed by 
CibaGeigy and DxR Group; Myers buys out Dorsey’s share of 
DxR Group. 
Winter 1996 Richard Klein is replaced by Peter Carlin; Myers’ new contact 
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Timeline of Major DxR events 
is Carlin’s direct report,  Craig Yarwood.   
April 1996 CibaGeigy merges with Sandoz to form Novartis 
August 1996 Version  1.0 Interactive Atlas of Human Anatomy released 
Late 1996 Version  1.1 Interactive Atlas of Human Anatomy released 
Winter 1997 DxR Group bids unsuccessfully on Netter diagram digitization 
project 
July 1997 Version  1.0 Interactive Atlas of Clinical Anatomy released 
Winter 1998 Coronary Heart Module (NovaCon series) is released; 
February 1998 Version  2.0 Interactive Atlas of Human Anatomy released 
April 1998 Across the board cuts of 20% mandated at Novartis; cutbacks 
expect to impact DxR Group 
April 1998 Version 2.0 Interactive Atlas of Clinical Anatomy released; 
Software Publishers Association nominated the product for the 
Codie Award "Best Debut of the Year."  
May 1998 Northstar Project is completed. 
Summer 1998 Congestive Heart Failure Module (NovaCon series) is 
released. 
January 1, 1999 Contract with Novartis scheduled to end 
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